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Human taradiddle EssayHuman history has witnessed numerous examples of bouts. Our history has taught us that wars ar unique by nature. varied philosophers at polar times were trying to generate solid philosophicalal dispositions of what war and scheme were. As a result, we possess sufficient theoretical basis for discussing the philosophical baseations of war, yet we pay non been cap able to predict our armed services failures. After the end of WWII the world has finally interpreted a deep breath, and spate were confident that force out would never enter their lives again. However, we are still surrounded by constant risks of war, and overcompensate witnessing the acts of violence, and murders. Certainly, contemporary wars are completely different from those at the beginning of the 20th century the development of the new-fashioned weaponry types and communication technologies, have sullen the simplest host actions into highly sophisticated acts. The war in Iraq has critically impacted the force ease in the world, and it is interesting to see, how Iraqi war would be explained through the optical prism of various philosophic works.Clausewitz On war Carl von Clausewitz has written a well grounded research on the philosophical system of war. His theoretical assumptions make it possible to distinguish philosophic implications of legions actions. Having evaluated what war is, Clausewitz was able to create a general structure of war, and I think that his ideas are easily use to the issues of the war in Iraq. War is nonhing but a duel on an extreme scale. If we would conceive as a whole the countless number of duels which make up a war, we shall do so best by supposing to ourselves twain wrestlers.Each strives by physical force to compel the other to submit his will to his will distributively endeavours to impel his adversary, and thus render him incapable of further resistance (Clausewitz 1989, p. 4). Although, this Clausewitz definiti on is very objective, grounded, and universally relevant (any war implies the fight of several(prenominal) opp iodinnts for world-beater), thither are some amendments which should be made in toll of war in Iraq.It is laborious to admit, but it is true, that the war in Iraq is nothing more than the fight for power Clausewitz does not distinguish whether this might be economic, social, or military power, or some other different aspect of governmental superiority. Clausewitz risks applying limited perspectives to discussing what war is. In the fight between the two wrestlers, only one of them initially seeks superiority. As a result, at the initial stage of war, only one of the opponents fights for power and superiority.Clausewitz supports this trace stating that two motives lead men to war instinctive hostility and hostile intention. In our definition of war, we have chosen as its characteristic the latter of these elements, because it is the most general. Has the U. S. st impos tureed the war in Iraq with hostile intentions? Probably, it has. umpteen of us entreat the fact that the U. S. military actions in Iraq were primarily aimed at promoting democracy in the country.To be objective, hardly any democracy endure survive in the whirl of blood, murders, terrorist acts and violence caused by military actions. However, in the fight between Iraq and the U. S. Clausewitz calculates to have neglected one essential stage of developing military actions the first stage is the military intervention, and it hardly looks as the fight of the two wrestlers. On the contrary, its image is convertible to unexpected blow on the side of the opponent to which another wrestler cannot stand and falls.The situation expound by Clausewitz is actually the next stage of war. Iraq required certain period of time to gather it specialty and to enter the war as an equal. At the stage when we started to receive the reports on murders and terrorist acts against American soldiers, one could intimate that the war has turned into the discussed fight. However, in this fight one of the opponents was trying to prove his superiority, while the other well-tried his best to brook the integrity of his physical territory and peace in the country.We cannot but agree with Clausewitz that war is never an isolated act, and it is never a separated single military blow. War does not shrink up suddenly, it does not spread to the full in a moment each of the two opponents can, therefore, wee-wee an opinion of the other, in a great measure, from what he is and what he does, instead of judging of him according to what he, purely speaking, should be or should do (Clausewitz 1989, 5) The war in Iraq had long prehistory. The linked States were continuously trying to defend their position in this military conflict.It was distinct that the war was inevitable. As a result it is difficult to argue the position of Clausewitz. Actually, the work of Clausewitz seems to be very cl ose to what we currently witness in Iraq. Of course, we do not know much as none of us has fortunately participated in this campaign. both we have at our disposal are news reports and other secondary information, but this secondary information allows analyzing the levelts in Iraq from the viewpoints of several philosophers. Clausewitz creates a philosophic picture of war.He implies that war does not change its face, and the structure of military actions and interactions remains unchanged, no matter at what historical period of our development a war may occur. This does not really matter, whether we use nuclear weapons or fight in the open sea the war is unceasingly the utmost use of force, which does not infract out of sudden, and which is the means of proving ones superiority. Jablonski Roots of dodge In his work, David Jablonski has evaluated the works of the four theorists, as apply to military actions and military strategies.It is surprising, that Jablonski was able to av oid deviate in his discussion. It is even more surprising, that the works of philosophers written at the beginning of the 20th century seem to have predicted the exact course of events during the war in Iraq. This, on the one hand, continues the line found in the work of Clausewitz the essence of military actions remains unchanged through the centuries. On the other hand, Jablonskis plectron helps us understand WHY the U. S. was involved into the war in Iraq, and has actually initiated it. In the get together States our mint have been slow to realize the changed conditions.Isolated as we have been from possible enemies, the citizenry could see minuscular chance for aggression by others. Separated as we are from Europe by the Atlantic, and from Asia by the peace-loving which form most certain and tremendously strong defensive barriers, we seemed to be protected by the fancy of the Almighty. The vulnerability of the whole country to aircraft as distinguished from the old cond itions that obtained when the frontiers or the coast had to be penetrated in advance an invasion of the country could be made, has greatly interested the people of the nation (Jablonski 1999, 452)What facts do we have in the war against Iraq? First, the U. S. has for long been isolated from others aggression. Even during WWII the U. S. was not directly involved into military actions. The terrorist acts of 2001 have been a tremendous shocking therapy to the whole American nation. The continuous isolation from the direct aggression has made the U. S. undetectable towards possible military and terrorist threats. The image of the almighty nation was rather exaggerated, and the events of 9/11 have be this assumption.The terrorist attacks had to attract the assist of the U. S. to its vulnerability and to eliminate the discussed senselessness, but the country has misinterpreted these events. The senselessness has turned into aggression against the states which were venture in promotin g terrorism (Iraq is in the top list of such promoters). As far as the United States has not experienced any acts of continuous aggression, which it could not stand, it has not fully realized the continuous effectuate of military actions brought into Iraqi land.In the introduction to his confine, David Jablonski puts emphases on the most critical elements of war. Modern military forces unremarkably work in an environment in which the major dilemma is that of properly matching continuity and change. the karyon attribute to such thinking is to imagine the future as it may be when it becomes the past(a) a thing of complex continuity. Thus, planning continuity and looking at military actions through the prism of the past is the significant element in making this strategy reasonable and justified. What are continuous impacts that the U.S. has caused onto the Iraqi cosmos? These are economic defeat, and the need to restore all social and political structures of the country. It is still unclear whether the U. S. was able to promote democratic ideals in Iraq, but it is evident that it has failed to apply the principles of continuity through the past to planning the Iraqi military strategy. Jablonski states that the significance of the theoretical works he discussed in his book is in that they are presented in a structured manner, and can be easily understood and applied in practice.It seems that both the U. S. in its war in Iraq, and the terrorists in their 9/11 attacks have applied the principles discussed by Jablonski sometimes implicitly, more frequently explicitly, they created images of how forward pass destruction of vital centers, could bring a nation to its knees. After all, there were the examples of mass panic on the home fronts and mutiny in the trenches during the recent war. Similar to Clausewitz, who creates parallels between military actions and wrestling, Jablonski also underlines the importance of the sudden effect.Consequentially, we co me to understanding an interesting military controversy military campaigns cannot be sudden, but the sudden effect of aerial or other destruction lots determines the success of the plotted military campaign. These two elements are integral to the U. S. intervention to Iraq, too. Liddell-Hart Strategy There are the two crucial elements which make Liddell-Harts view applicable to the war in Iraq first, the author extensively researches the historical implications of specific military actions, and second, he does not expand his research to broader notions, but is rather concentrated on the cause-effect research.His book is in many instances similar to that of Clausewitz. This is why the author is initially biased. In both works the reviewer meets identical philosophical parallels To move along the line of natural expectation consolidates the opponents balance and thus increases his resisting power. In war, as in wrestling, the attempt to throw the opponent without loosening his footh old and disconcerting the balance results in self-exhaustion, increasing in disproportionate ration to the effective strain upon him.Success by such method only becomes possible through an immense margin of superior strength in some form and, even so, tends to lose decisiveness. (Liddell-Hart 1991, 5) In this citation, we find many elements which have already been found in other philosophical works loosening foothold may be paralleled to the sudden aerial attacks, while moving along the line of natural expectation is similar to complying with the principles of continuity and thorough planning. Simultaneously, it is difficult to apply this statement to the military actions in Iraq. If the U. S.used Liddell-Harts philosophical implications in developing its strategy in Iraq, it would never apply the means of sudden attack against the Iraqi nation. People in Iraq would not know what means macrocosm bombed. As a result, the U. S. would risk losing its reigning positions. The philoso phic perspective created by Liddell-Hart is hardly applicable to the war in Iraq or to any other military campaign in contemporary world. In addition, when Liddell-Hart speaks about morale in war, he represents its too idealistic image the violence of American soldiers against Iraqi people eliminates any possibility to link morale to the war in Iraq.Niccolo Machiavelli The Prince A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else for his theme, than war and its rules and discipline for this is the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often enables men to evolve from a private station to that rank. This is another aspect of the war in Iraq, described in the equipment casualty of Niccolo Machiavellis The Prince. As Hitler used the war to prove his superiority and to create the nation of Aryans, the U. S.seems to be in constant need to prove its superiority to other nations. Several recent decades have turned into the days of constant fight, in which the U. S. eternally positioned itself as the leading and powerful nation Vietnam, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Yugoslavia, and finally, Iraq who is going to be the next? Machiavelli makes special emphasis on the importance for the prince to understand and to possess the art of war a prince who does not understand the art of war, over and above other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot be respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. (Machiavelli, 2006)The best information and intelligence resources have been employed to develop a sound military strategy towards Iraq, yet the U. S. was not able to display a skilful come up towards Iraqi intervention. Numerous deaths of the American soldiers and their softness to find common language with the native population, whom they had to protect, suggest that the United States did not possess any sound military skills. Expectation of palmy victory usually leads to easy failure. The war in Iraq has displayed the U. S. inability to analyze the world military history, about which Machiavelli speaks.The author refers to the importance for the prince to study the actions of illustrious men and to see how they behaved themselves during war. Being powerful does not mean being non-educated being powerful means being skillful, reasonable, and objective. Military failures in Vietnam and Yugoslavia have not taught the U. S. any meaningful lessons. In banknote from Clausewitz, Liddell-Hart, and Jablonski, Machiavelli did not apply any historical perspectives to evaluating military strategies, but he was wise enough to accentuate the importance of historical lessons, and of the ability to properly evaluate these lessons.Peter Paret Makers of Modern Strategy While Clausewitz applied the painting parallels to researching war, Paret has performed a profound research of several philosophic writings related to the topic of war. All authors he discussed in his book sought to answer several crucial questions whether it was possible to evaluate war, whether it was a viable tool of foreign policy, and how ethical war was. Parets views are directly connected with the understanding of nuclear threats as applied to military strategies. Parets book is actually the selection of the major philosophic works and their evaluation.It seems that modern philosophers try to distance themselves from creating their own ideas about war, but prefer analyzing the ideas of others as applied to contemporary political and military environment. In the introduction to his book, Paret writes that strategy is the use of armed force to carry out the military objectives and, by extension, the political purpose of the war. To those engaged in the direction and conduct of war, strategy has often appeared more simply, in Moltkes phrase, as a system of expedients Thus, war is initially the conjunction of political and military ideas.The war in Iraq is also the combi nation of political and military aims, but which of them prevails? In his book, Paret often cannot make a case. He states that Machiavelli lived during the time when warfare was unregulate and thus the relevance of his assumptions could decrease. However, who says that our warfare is regulated? Paret suggests that while Clausewitz supported the idea of war to be limited in time, goals, and strategies, there was no lay to global military campaigns. Does this mean that local military conflicts similar to those in Iraq cannot expand beyond the geographical borders of the Iraqi nation?They can, and the conflict in Iraq has already stretched itself across the world. The war in Iraq has already turned into the political fight between the two opposing political camps, and the perspective of the global war has never been so close since the end of WWII. This is why it is difficult to understand the aim of Parets analysis. For the aims of objective military research, one should rather read the original works of philosophers, than their subjective interpretations made by contemporary authors. sunshine Tzu The Art of WarWhoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted. Therefore the clever scrapper imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemys will to be obligate on him. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way (Sun Tzu 1971, 24)The ideas of war produced by Sun Tzu, partially seem as odd as the instruments he offers to use if one does not want to fight. On the one hand, being first to the field also implies exploitation sudden tactics. On the other hand, what odd instruments could Iraqi people use to openly claim their desire not to start war with the U. S .? One should not seize its tactics which had been successful earlier, but it should be regulated according to the constantly changing military environments. Moreover, using the tactics which has already proved to be a failure is a guaranteed double failure. The U. S.has not taken into account numerous important elements of an effective military strategy being sudden does not forever and a day mean being successful. Aerial attacks make people fall to their knees, but do not break them completely. The U. S. develops a sound strategy of removing its military from the Iraqi territory. The aim is to turn retreat into a victory, which is roughly impossible. Until the U. S. is able to re-evaluate its defeats and tactics in previous military campaigns, it will have to be prepared to new military failures. Conclusion I think that each of the analyzed philosophers has something to say about the war in Iraq.Each of them discussed interesting elements of military strategy which could be app lied to Iraqi military campaigns. Although certain views are limited, some risk being biased, and some cannot make the case at all, all of them deserve attention at least for having researched the question which we will hardly ever answer What is War? It is never stable, it is always changeable, it always has a different face, and sometimes we even fail to recognize it from the start. One thing is evident no matter how difficult a war can be, no excuses can justify our inability to fight well. BIBLIOGRAPHYClausewitz, C. On War. Princeton Princeton University Press, 1989. Jablonski, D. Roots of Strategy. Book 4. Merchanicsburg Stackpole Books, 1999. Liddel-Hart, Basil H. Strategy Second Revised Edition. New York crown Books, 1991. Machiavelli, N. The Prince. The Project Gutenberg, 2006. Available from http//www. gutenberg. org/files/1232/1232-h/1232-h. htm Paret, P. , G. A. Craig F. Gilbert. Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton Princeton Universi ty Press, 1986. Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Translated by Samueal B. Griffith. Oxford Oxford University Press, 1971.